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QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the cost-shifting provision of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B), 
provides that a court may "award reasonable attorneys’ fees as
part of the costs to the parents" who are prevailing parties,
authorize an award of expert costs?
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Respondents Pearl and Theodore Murphy are the parents of
Joseph Murphy, a child with disabilities. The Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1487 (2000),
obligates school districts to provide children with disabilities a
"free appropriate public education." Id. 1412(a)(1). When 
Murphys and petitioner Arlington Central School District Board
of Education reached an impasse over the appropriate educational
placement for Joe, the Murphys invoked IDEA’s due process
provision and prevailed. The Murphys could not have succeeded
without their educational expert’s assistance.
The question before the Court is whether IDEA’s cost-
shifting provision, 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B), authorizes 
Murphys to recover the cost of their expert’s participation. The
answer is yes. The text, history, and purpose of Section
1415(i)(3)(B) demonstrate that it empowers courts to 
parents the costs of experts. Because Congress authorized these
awards, petitioner’s contention that West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), controls this case
misses the mark.
The evidence that Congress authorized prevailing parents to
recover expert costs is overwhelming. Congress added Section
1415(i)(3)(B) to IDEA in 1986 when it enacted the Handicapped
Children’s Protection Act (HCPA) to overturn Smith v. Robinson,
468 U.S. 992 (1984). Smith had held that attorneys’ fees were
unavailable to prevailing parents under the then-current version
of IDEA. Congress responded in the HCPA first by authorizing
awards of"attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents" in
Section 1415(i)(3)(B). Then, in a provision of the 
petitioner disregards, Congress underscored that the phrase "the
costs to the parents" includes expert costs by directing the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to report on the "attorneys’
fees, costs, and expenses awarded" to prevailing parents and "the
2number of hours spent by personnel, including attorneys and
consultants" in IDEA proceedings. P.L. 99-372, § 4(b)(3), 
Stat. 796, 797-98 (1986). Taken together, these provisions
demonstrate that Congress used "costs" in its ordinary sense --
to cover the expenses parents incur in IDEA proceedings,
including the costs of consultants and experts -- and not as a
restrictive legal term of art.
The history of Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’s implementation
confirms this reading. Courts uniformly understood IDEA to
permit awards of expert costs. The GAO Report recognized that
expert costs were recoverable. And during Congress’
deliberations on the HCPA, there was bipartisan consensus that
prevailing parents should recover the costs of experts -- a
consensus reflected in uncontradicted statements in the House,
the Senate, and the Conference Report.
The Murphys’ reading of the statute gives effect to the text of
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) and is consistent with IDEA’s core 
providing children with disabilities a free, appropriate public
education. The same cannot be said of petitioner’s interpretation,
which rewrites Section 1415(i)(3)(B) to provide for attorneys’
fees and nothing more, and precludes parents from recovering
expert costs, even though they need expert assistance to vindicate
their right to participate in IDEA proceedings. Petitioner’s
reading thus imperils the fair resolution of due process hearings
and subverts IDEA’s core goal of ensuring that children with
disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free.
3STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Petitioner’s rendition of the statutes involved omits relevant
provisions of the HCPA, P.L. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796, which
amended IDEA.
HCPA Section 2 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
!415(i)(3)(B)) provided:
In any action or proceeding brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, may award
reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to
the parent or guardian of a handicapped child or
youth who is the prevailing party.
HCPA Section 3 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1415(/))
(citation omitted) provided:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to restrict
or limit the rights, procedures, or remedies
available under the Constitution, title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal
statutes protecting the rights of handicapped
children and youth * * * *
HCPA Section 4, reprinted in 20 U.S.C. 1415 note (citation
IDEA was reauthorized and amended in 2004. P.L. 108-446, 118 Stat.
2647. The operative language of the cost-shifting provision was not
materially changed. It now reads: "In any action or proceeding brought
under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable
attorneys’ fees as part of the costs - (I) to a prevailing party who is the
parent of a child with a disability .... " 20 U.S.C.A. 1415(i)(3)(B) 
2005). Petitioner does not contend that this change is significant. Unless
otherwise noted, citations are to the 2000 United States Code.
4omitted), provides:
(a) The Comptroller General of the United States,
through the General Accounting Office, shall
conduct a study of the impact of the amendments
to the Education of the Handicapped Act made
under section 2 of this Act * * * *
(b) The report authorized under subsection (a)
shall include the following information: * * * *
(3) Data, for a geographically
representative selective sample of States,
indicating (A) the specific amount 
attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses
awarded to the prevailing party, in each
action and proceeding under section
615(e)(4)(B) from the date 
enactment of this Act through fiscal year
1988, and the range of such fees, costs,
and expenses awarded in the actions and
proceedings under such section,
categorized by type of complaint and (B)
for the same sample as in (A) the number
of hours spent by personnel, including
attorneys and consultants, involved in the
action or proceeding, and expenses
incurred by the parents and the State
educational agency and local educational
agency,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
In 1986, Congress added the relevant statutory text to IDEA
by enacting the HCPA. The HCPA and its history are discussed
in detail below. To put the dispute between the Murphys and
Arlington Central in context, however, we provide a brief
overview of IDEA.2
IDEA was enacted to address Congress’ concern that "more
than one-half of the children with disabilities in the United States
do not receive appropriate services." 20 U.S.C. 1400(c)(2)(B).
It sought to ensure "that all children with disabilities have
2 IDEA’s roots trace back to the Education of the Handicapped Act
(EHA), P.L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970), which was Congress’ first effort
to address the needs of children with disabilities. But EHA did not stem
the tide of overt discrimination in education against these children.
Parents and civil rights groups began turning to the federal courts, where
they won substantial relief in two path-breaking decisions: Mills v. Board
of Education of the Distric t of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)
and Pennsylvania Ass ’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania (PARC),
334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), and 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa 1972).
The courts in these cases concluded (PARC through a consent decree) that
systematic discrimination against children with disabilities in the
provision of public education violated the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at
875; PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 279. The courts ordered an end to
discrimination and entered broad injunctive relief. Id. In the wake of
these decisions, Congress substantially overhauled the EHA with the
passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975
(E.AHCA), P.L. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. For a detailed history of the
statute’s early evolution, including the impact these cases had on the
EAHCA, see Hendrik Hudson Central School District ~ Board of
Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-80 (1982). In 1990, Congress
changed the title of the statute to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. P.L. 101-476, § 901(a)(1), (3), 104 Stat. 1103, 1141-42.
available to them a free appropriate public education" and "that
the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such
children are protected." Id. 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B). As this 
has recognized, IDEA "confers upon disabled students an
enforceable substantive right to public education." Honigv. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 310 (1984); see also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180,
192-200.
Two provisions of IDEA are relevant here. First, Section
1414 sets forth procedures to identify and evaluate children with
disabilities and determine what constitutes an appropriate
education. Once a child with disabilities has been identified,
IDEA requires the school district to prepare an "individualized
educational program" (IEP) that, among other things, describes
the educational and related services to be provided to the child,
establishes annual goals to assess whether the child is making
progress, and determines the child’s appropriate educational
placement. 20 U.S.C. 1414(d). Congress intended parents 
participate in the development of their child’s IEP. Id.
1414(d)(1)(B)(i).
Second, anticipating that disagreements would arise between
parents and schools, Section 1415 establishes procedural
protections that must be afforded to the parties. Parents are
entitled to written notice whenever a school either proposes or
refuses "to initiate or change" a child’s IEP. Id. 1415(b)(3). If 
impasse arises over any element of the IEP, parents have the right
to "an impartial due process hearing." Id. 1415(f)(1). 
process hearings are initiated by the submission of a formal
complaint, to which the school must respond. Id. 1415(b)(6)-(7).
In the event that dispute resolution fails, a due process hearing is
held before an impartial hearing officer independent of the
school. Id. 1415(f)(1), 
Section 1415 also establishes a number of "safeguards" to
ensure procedural fairness during hearings. Parties have"the right
to be accompanied and advised by counsel and by individuals with
special knowledge or training with respect to the problems of
children with disabilities." Id. 1415(h)(1). In practice, parents 
often unrepresented by counsel in IDEA hearings, although school
districts generally have counsel) Parties have "the fight to present
evidence and confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance
of witnesses." Id. 1415(h)(2). A complete transcript or recording
must be made of the hearing and provided to parents on request,
and findings of facts and decisions must be in writing. Id.
1415(h)(3)-(4). In states like New York, which opt for a two-tier
system, adverse rulings may be appealed to the state educational
agency. Id. 1415(g).
Any party aggrieved by the results of the administrative
process may file suit in either federal or state court. Id.
1415(i)(2)(A). Judicial review is based on the record of the 
process hearing, with limited opportunity for supplementation. Id.
1415(i)(2)(B). Courts generally resolve IDEA cases on summary
judgment, even when evidence compiled during the due process
hearing is conflicting. See, e.g., Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d
493,496 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002).4
3 See 150 Cong. Rec. $5351 (daily ed. May 12, 2004) (reporting that
parents are represented by counsel in about one-third of the due process
hearings held in New York and Illinois, while school districts have lawyers
in virtually all cases); see also Am. Bar Ass’n, Comm’n on Nonlawyer
Practice, Nonlawyer Activity in Law Related Situations: A Report with
Recommendations 81 (1995) (reporting that "[i]n many communities there
appear to be few, if any, lawyers experienced or willing to handle" IDEA
cases for parents).
4 Rowley held that courts must give "due weight" to the findings of
the state administrative proceeding and should not "substitute their own
(continued...)
B. Proceedings Below
1. The Murphys’ son Joe is a child with learning disabilities.5
The Murphys live in upstate New York and have modest means,
’with a total income of around $47,000. 6 This controversy arose
in September 1997, when Joe was in eighth grade. At the
beginning of the school year, a speech/language specialist found
Joe to be "severely functionally language disordered." SRO
Decision at 6. A neuropsychologist also evaluated Joe and
reported that he had a "near total incapacity to process language,
written or oral." Id. At the end of eighth grade, Arlington
Central’s speech/language evaluator concluded that Joe was a
(...continued)
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities
they review." 458 U.S. at 206; see also Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of
Educ. v. P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 2004); L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist.,
379 F.3d 966, 974 (10th Cir. 2004). Ordinarily, parties are not permitted
to supplement the record or to have witnesses testify in review
proceedings unless they can show prejudice or that the evidence was
unavailable at the time of the state hearing. See, e.g., West Platte R-II
Sch. Dist. v. Wilson, No. 05-1973, 2006 WL 488410, at *2 (8th Cir. Mar.
2, 2006); Springer v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 134 F.3d 659 (4th Cir.
1998); Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 736 F.2d 773 (lst Cir.
1984).
5 This recitation is drawn from the decision of the State Review
Officer (SRO), which is in the record (see Exhibit A to the Status Report
filed by Arlington Central on Dec. 28, 1999 (Docket Entry 8)), and 
available at http://www.sro.nysed.gov/1999/99-065.htm (last visited on
Mar. 22, 2006) (SRO Decision).
6 See Joint Appendix in Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Edue., CV-00-7358, 297 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2002), at 19 (certification 
Pearl Murphy, dated Aug. 6, 1999, attached to plaintiff’s motion to show
cause, dated Sept. 7, 1999); id. at 110 (transcript of hearing on plaintiff’s
show cause motion in Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Seh. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
No. CV-99-1258 (Sept. 7, 1999)).
9"high risk" student both academically and emotionally and
recommended that he be placed in a residential school for
language impaired students. Id. at 8.7
Arlington Central nonetheless proposed an IEP that would
place Joe in Arlington High School in classes with other students
with disabilities. Id. at 9. To help them evaluate Joe’s
educational options, the Murphys retained Marilyn Arons, an
educator who has worked on special education matters since
1963.s Arons reviewed Joe’s evaluations, conducted her own
assessment, attended IEP meetings and met with school officials
to urge Arlington Central to provide Joe with more intensive
speech/language training. Id. When Arlington Central failed to
do so, the Murphys enrolled Joe in the Kildonan School, a private
school for learning disabled students. At the same time, the
Murphys filed an IDEA administrative complaint pro se seeking
a due process hearing to establish Kildonan as Joe’s appropriate
placement and to compel Arlington Central to reimburse his
tuition. Id.
The Murphys did not have counsel at the due process hearing,
which stretched over six days in October 1998 and was
7 Joe’s problems in school had started years earlier. He had
"attention difficulties" in kindergarten, he was "diagnosed by a
neurologist as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder" in second
grade, and he had to repeat third grade. SRO Decision at 1-2. By fourth
grade, Joe was classified as "learning disabled." Id. at 3. The SRO
Decision gives a full account of Joe’s difficulties in school. Id. at 1-6.
s Arons holds a masters degree in early childhood education and had
been qualified as an expert in prior proceedings. Borough of Palmyra Bd.
ofEduc, v. R.C., No. 97-6199, 31 IDELR ¶ 3 (D.N.J. 1999); see Pet. App.
at 21a-22a, 35a.
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reconvened for several more days in April 1999. Id. at 9-10.9
Arlington Central had counsel. Id. Arons did not testify at the
hearing but did assist the Murphys in reviewing Joe’s educational
evaluations, framing questions for the school board’s experts, and
preparing their affirmative case. JA 23a-28a; 63a-66a. On July
7, 1999, the impartial hearing officer held that the Kildonan
School, not Arlington High School, was the appropriate
placement for Joe. SRO Decision at 9-10. The ruling required
Arlington Central to reimburse the tuition the Murphys had
already paid for the 1998-1999 school year. Id. Arlington
Central appealed to the State Review Officer (SRO) on August
18, 1999, thereby staying the reimbursement order.
2. Meanwhile, the start of the 1999-2000 school year was
approaching and the Murphys could not afford to continue to pay
Joe’s tuition. Still proceedingpro se, the Murphys filed an action
in district court to require Arlington Central to pay Joe’s tuition
while its appeal to the SRO was pending. Before the district
court ruled, the SRO affirmed. Id at 13-16. Arlington Central
did not reimburse the Murphys for the 1998-1999 tuition until the
district court issued a show cause order in late January 2000 --
9 New York law permits non-lawyers to assist parents to advocate their
claims in due process hearings. SRO Decision at 9. Arons helped the
Murphys in this capacity as well. Id. Arons’ certification, submitted in
support of the Murphys’ request for costs, makes clear that compensation
was sought only for those services rendered in her capacity as an expert in
special education matters, not as an advocate. JA at 20a-33a; 63a-66a. In
so doing, Arons followed the line between compensable and non-
compensable activities drawn in Arons v. New Jersey State Board of
Education, 842 F.2d 58, 62-63 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding educational expert
may receive fees as an expert consultant or witness, but may not for legal
services).
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halfway into the next school year.l°
The parties remained divided over Joe’s placement (and the
liability for his tuition) for the 1999-2000 school year. To
resolve that issue, the Murphys requested a new due process
hearing and, in the still-pending district court action, invoked
IDEA’s "stay put" provision to require Arlington Central to pay
Joe’s tuition. The Murphys contended that the SRO’s ruling had
changed Joe’s IEP to provide that his placement was Kildonan;
Arlington Central argued that the SRO’s ruling applied only to
the prior school year. The district court agreed with the Murphys
and directed Arlington Central to pay Joe’s tuition pending a final
determination of the Murphys’ IDEA claim. Murphy v. Arlington
Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 86 F. Supp. 2d 354, 358-359
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). The Second Circuit affirmed. 297 F.3d 195
(2d Cir. 2002).11
3.a. Following that ruling, with all other issues now
resolved, the Murphys filed a motion in the district court to
recover $29,350 for the services that Arons provided as an expert.
lo See Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. CV-99-
9294 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2000). Arlington Central challenged the SRO’s
decision in state court and lost. See In re Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. State
Review Officer, Index No. 1212/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dutchess County,
Sept. 13, 2002).
H The Murphys had counsel on the 2002 appeal to the Second
Circuit. As noted, they proceeded pro se in all other proceedings. The
undersigned counsel of record participated as counsel for amici in support
of the Murphys’ position in the 2005 Second Circuit appeal and became
counsel for the Murphys after Arlington Central filed its petition for
certiorari.
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JA at 20a-33a; 63a-66a.12 The district court accepted Arons’
qualifications as "’a professional educator [who] ... specializes
in curriculum development for exceptional children.’" Pet. App.
21a (quoting Arons, 842 F.2d at 62-63). But it cut the request
substantially, not because the Murphys ought compensation for
Arons’ advocacy efforts as petitioner suggests, but because her
services as an expert were rendered either before the
commencement of the due process hearing (September 1998) 
after the district court’s initial ruling in the Murphys’ favor
(March 2000). In the court’s view, only services provided
between these two events were rendered in an "action or
proceeding," as IDEA requires. Id. at 37a-38a. The judge added,
"nothing I have said in this opinion or the result I have reached
should be regarded as a denigration ofMarilyn Arons’s abilities
or the devoted services she rendered to the Murphy family. I
have no doubt that those services were worth over $29,000." Id.
at 41a-42a.
The district court found that Arons spent 43.25 hours
assisting the Murphys prepare for and participate in the due
process hearing. Id. at 38a. The court concluded that Arons’
work helping the Murphys understand the submissions of the
school board’s experts, reviewing technical materials that would
be relied on in the hearing, and formulating questions to use in
cross-examining the school board’s experts, qualified as
reimbursable expert costs. Id. at 22a, 39a-40a. Finding $200 per
hour a proper valuation ofArons’ expert services, id. at 40a-41 a,
the court awarded the Murphys $8,650. Id. at 41a. Arlington
Central appealed; the Murphys did not cross appeal.
~2 For reasons not apparent in the record, the Murphys did not seek
reimbursement for the costs of the services provided by Gerald Brooks, a
speech/language pathologist, who prepared a report and testified on their
behalf. SRODecision, at 11-12.
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3.b. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the IDEA
authorizes courts to award expert costs to prevailing parents. Pet.
App. at 2a. It first examined this Court’s rulings in Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), and West
Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991),
which held that, unless Congress pecifies otherwise, a statutory
authorization for attorneys’ fees does not encompass expert costs.
Pet. App. at 8a-9a. The court noted that, in contrast to 42 U.S.C.
1988, the statute at issue in Casey, Congress had left no doubt
that expert costs were to be reimbursed to prevailing parents
under the IDEA. Pet. App. at 9a-10a. This conclusion was based
in part on the Joint Statement of the Conferees, which made
explicit that expert costs were recoverable under IDEA. Id. at 9a.
The court also observed that "[e]xpert testimony is often critical
in IDEA cases, which are fact-intensive inquiries about the
child’s disability and the effectiveness of the measures school
boards have offered to secure a free appropriate public
education." Id. at 12a. The availability of expert costs would
thus be in keeping with IDEA’s remedial purpose. Id. at
13a-14a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The question in this case is whether parents like the Murphys
may recover the costs of the expert who assisted them in a due
process hearing involving the highest stakes imaginable -- their
child’s future. The statute’s text, history, and purpose all point to
the conclusion that IDEA authorizes prevailing parents to recover
expert costs.
I. IDEA provides that "in any action or proceeding brought"
under the Act, "the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable
attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with
a disability...." 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B) (emphasis added). 
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most natural reading of the phrase "the costs to the parents"
encompasses all expenses parents incur in IDEA proceedings,
including the cost of experts.
This reading is confirmed by Congress’ direction to the GAO
to study the legislation’s fiscal impact and to report to Congress
on the "amount of the attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses"
awarded in IDEA litigation, as well as the number of
compensable hour’s spent by "attorneys and consultants" involved
in the proceeding. This instruction would make no sense unless
Congress intended expert consultants to be reimbursed. The
GAO Report states that "[e]xpert witness fees" are "examples of
reimbursable expenses" under the Act.
This reading also gives substance to IDEA’s overarching
goals of ensuring that children with disabilities are provided "a
free appropriate public education" and that the rights of children
and parents are safeguarded. Reading IDEA’s cost-shifting
provision to exclude expert costs would be manifestly at odds
with the Act’s requirement that schools provide a "free"
education. See, e.g., Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep ’t of
Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985). Parents need expert assistance
to challenge school determinations, Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct.
528,536 (2005), but many parents cannot afford to pay experts.
If costs for experts are unavailable, these parents will be deprived
of their fight to challenge school decisions that deny their child’s
right to an appropriate education, a result Congress could not
have possibly intended. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
Petitioner’ s reading violates several cardinal rules of statutory
construction. Petitioner analyzes the language of IDEA through
the lens of 42 U.S.C. 1988, even though the two statutes are quite
different in language and purpose. Petitioner argues that Section
1415(i)(3)(B) authorizes the award only att orneys’ fees,
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thereby rendering the phrase "as part of the costs to the parents"
meaningless. And petitioner’s reading undermines IDEA’s goals
by precluding parents from recovering the costs of expert
assistance, even though that assistance is essential to the fair
resolution of IDEA due process hearings.
II. The history of Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’s implementation
confirms that Congress authorized parents to recover expert costs.
The GAO read it in that manner. And courts uniformly held that
it empowered them to award expert costs. Indeed, for fil~een
years following Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’s enactment, courts 
nearly unanimous in holding that it provides for the payment of
expert costs. This history belies petitioner’s central claim that
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) "unambiguously" fails to authorize 
to award expert costs to prevailing parents.
The drafting history of the HCPA reaffirms that Congress
authorized the award of expert costs to parents. Although there
were controversial issues that slowed the HCPA’s passage, there
was bipartisan agreement in both Houses at every stage of
Congress’ deliberations that prevailing parents should recover
expert costs. The Joint Statement crystallizes Congress’
judgment: "The conferees intend that the term ’attorneys’ fees as
part of the costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert
witnesses and the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which
is found necessary to the preparation of" the parents’ case, "as
well as traditional costs incurred in the course of litigating a
case." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986).
III. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, nothing in Crawford
Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), or West
Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991),
informs the meaning of Section 1415(i)(3)(B). Casey involved
statutes that are different in text and language from IDEA, and the
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HCPA was enactedbefore either case was decided. "[Courts] are
to read the words of [statutory] text as any ordinary Member of
Congress would have read them." Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.
380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. AT&TCo., 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994). Nothing in the
language or history of the HCPA suggests that the "ordinary
Member[s] of Congress" who participated in its enactment
anticipated the narrow, term-of-art meaning these later rulings
gave to the phrase "attorneys’ fees as part of costs." This point
takes on special force because Casey rejected the argument (not
presented here) that expert fees are recoverable as part of the
attorneys’ fees parties incur in federal court litigation, not as part
of the "the costs ... parents" incur in state administrative
proceedings.
Nor does Casey’s rationale apply to IDEA. Casey held that
28 U.S.C. 1821(b) and 1920 -- which fix compensation for
witnesses in federal court proceedings -- govern expert fees in
civil rights cases because Congress did not express an intent to
repeal these provisions when it enacted Section 1988. 499 U.S.
at 83. But Casey’s repeal-by-implication rationale has no
application to IDEA. Sections 1821 and 1920 apply only in
federal court actions, not in state due process proceedings. If
accepted, petitioner’s argument would deprive parents of any
opportunity to recover the costs they incur in due process
hearings -- a result flatly at odds with Congress’ clear intent.
IV. Petitioner’s invocation of the Spending Clause is
untimely, incorrect, and beside the point. It was not raised below
and thus is forfeited. It is incorrect because neither the HCPA nor
IDEA is exclusively a Spending Clause statute. See, e.g., Cedar
Rapids County Sch. Dist. v. Garrett F., 526 U.S. 66, 76-77
(1999); Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180,
192-200. And it is beside the point because the Spending Clause
17
requires Congress to give states
obligations when they accept
1415(i)(3)(B) did just 
fair notice of their fiscal
federal grants. Section
ARGUMENT
I. The Text of IDEA Confirms That Expert Costs May
Be Recovered By Prevailing Parents.
A. Section 1415(i)(3)(B) Authorizes the Payment of 
Costs.
1. Statutory language is the starting point in any case of
statutory construction. Leocal v. Ashcrofi, 543 U.S. 1, 8 (2004).
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) of IDEA provides that, "[i]n any action 
proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion,
may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the
parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party."
(emphasis added).
Statutory language should be given its most natural reading.
Rousey v. Jacoway, 125 S. Ct. 1561, 1568 (2005); see also
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 405 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our job begins
with a text that Congress has passedand the President has signed.
We are to read the words of that text as any ordinary Member of
Congress would have read them ... and apply the meaning so
determined.") (citation omitted). Read in this light, the words
"attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to the parents" authorize
reimbursement of all costs parents incur in IDEA proceedings,
including expert costs. The language is categorical. There is no
textual basis for distinguishing the cost of hiring an expert from
any other cost parents incur in IDEA proceedings. Expert costs,
like attorneys’ fees, are indisputably "part of the costs" parents
incur in an action or proceeding brought under IDEA. Experts
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are not provided to parents free-of-charge under IDEA. Nor are
experts good Samaritans who volunteer their services without
compensation. Reading IDEA’s text in accordance with its
"ordinary or natural reading," Leocal, 543 U.S. at 1, 9 (2004),
yields only one conclusion: Expert costs are reimbursable
because they are "part of the costs to the parents." See also
Consumer Elecs. Ass ’n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291,298 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("[S]tatutes written in broad, sweeping language should 
given broad, sweeping application") (citation omitted).
2. The GAO report provision confirms this reading. In the
HCPA, Congress directed the GAO to study and report on the
"attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses awarded to the prevailing
party" in a representative sample of states, and to include
information about "the number of hours spent by personnel,
including attorneys and consultants, involved in the action or
proceeding." P.L. 99-372, § 4(b)(3), 100 Stat. 796, 797-98
(1986) (emphasis added).
This Court has repeatedly stressed that the "[i]nterpretation
of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory
text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and
consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis."
Dolan v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1252, 1257 (2006).~3
Nonetheless, petitioner and the United States ignore this
provision, even though it sheds considerable light on Section
1415(i)(3)(B). By instructing the GAO to study the "attorneys’
fees, costs and expenses" awarded in IDEA cases, including the
time spent by "attorneys and consultants," Congress ignaled that
13 See also Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60
(2004) ("Statutory construction is a ’holistic endeavor.") (citations omitted);
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 ("[T]he Court construes language in its context and in
light of the terms surrounding it.").
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it expected Section 1415(i)(3)(B) to be read broadly to 
these expenses. Indeed, Congress’ direction to the GAO would
be inexplicable if Congress did not anticipate that the expenses
for "consultants" would be recoverable. The GAO certainly
understood the statute in that way. Its Report states that"[e]xpert
witness fees, costs of tests or evaluations found to be necessary
during the case, and court costs for services rendered during
administrative and court proceedings are examples of
reimbursable expenses" under the Act. U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, Special Education: The Attorney Fees Provision of Public
Law 99-372 13 (Nov. 1989) (GAO Report).14
3. Petitioner also fails to grapple with Section 1415(/)
~4 Congress’ use of "consultant" rather than "expert" is readily
understood. Congress intended that the phrase "the costs to the parents"
reach not only expert costs, but also "expenses" and the costs of tests and
evaluations associated with the development of the IEP. Thus, Congress
used the term "consultant" to ensure that the GAO also Studied the costs
to parents of having these tests administered and evaluated and that other
services rendered by non-testifying experts were reimbursed.
Dictionaries define the terms as synonyms. See, e.g., Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary 490 (1981 ed.). Petitioner contends that
because Arons did not testify at the due process hearing, her services
would be non-compensable even if the Murphys prevail. Pet. Br. at 30
n. 12. This Court denied certiorari on this issue, but petitioner’s argument
is without merit in any event. Section 4 of the HCPA recognizes that
"expenses" and the cost of "consultants" would be reimbursed. The Joint
Statement accompanying the HCPA also identifies as compensable
expenses expert witness fees, costs of tests and evaluations, and all other
litigation costs and expenses reasonably expended by the parents, which
plainly includes consultant fees. Finally, courts have routinely
reimbursed parents for the costs of non-testifying experts. See, e.g., Bd.
ofEduc, v. Summers, 358 F. Supp. 2d 462, 473 (D. Md. 2005); Lamoine
Seh. Comm. v. Ms. Z, 353 F. Supp. 2d 18, 44 (D. Me. 2005); Noyes v.
Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1251 (S.D. Cal.
2004); Turton v. Crisp County Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 1535, 1540 (M.D.
Ga. 1988).
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(Section 3 of the HCPA), which overturned Smith by providing
that claims under the Constitution and the Civil Rights and
Rehabilitation Acts may be joined with claims under IDEA. This
provision is significant because, at the time the HCPA was
enacted, it was understood that courts could award expert costs in
Civil Rights and Rehabilitation Act cases. See Bradley v. City of
RichmondSch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696,706-710 (1974). Thus, from
the vantage point of the Congress that enacted the HCPA, the
ordinary usage of the word "costs" would have subsumed the
costs of experts.
B. IDEA’s Key Substantive Provisions Confirm that Expert
Costs May Be Awarded to Prevailing Parents.
The conclusion that expert costs are reimbursable is also in
keeping with IDEA’s overarching goals: (1) to ensure that
children with disabilities receive a "free appropriate public
education" and (2) to safeguard the rights of parents to challenge
school decisions that adversely affect their child. This Court
routinely looks to IDEA’s "overall statutory scheme" in
interpreting its provisions. See, e.g., Garret F., 526 U.S. at 73;
see generally Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 60.
1. IDEA’s core goal is to assure that "all children with
disabilities have available to them.., a free appropriate public
education." 20 U.S.C. 1400(c). This assurance is deeply
ingrained in the Act. See, e.g., id. 1400(d)(1)(A), 1412(a)(1)(A),
1415(a); see also 1401(8)(A) (defining "free appropriate public
education" as one "provided at public expense" and "without
charge"); 1401(25) (defining "special education" to 
"specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents"). This
Court has faithfully implemented Congress’ instruction that an
appropriate education be provided to children with disabilities
"without charge" and "at no cost to parents." For instance, in
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GarretF., 526 U.S. at 73, and Irving Independent School District
v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883,888-91 (1986), the Court invoked IDEA’s
commitment to a J?ee appropriate education in construing the
"related services" provision to require schools to provide nursing
care to students, notwithstanding the expense. Id.
InBurlington, the Court relied on IDEA’s promise of a "free"
appropriate education in interpreting IDEA’s grant of equitable
authority. 471 U.S. at 368-70. Burlington held that this
provision empowered courts to require school districts to
reimburse parents for the costs of unilateral placements in private
schools if the court ultimately determines that such placement
was warranted under the Act. Id. Then-Justice Rehnquist’s
opinion for a unanimous Court makes exactly the point that the
Murphys make here, emphasizing that it would be "an empty
victory" for parents to pay for the placement but "to have a court
tell them several years later that they were fight but that these
expenditures could not in a proper case be reimbursed by the
school officials." Id. at 370. Such a result would be at odds with
"the child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the
parents’ fight to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and
all of the procedural safeguards" built into the Act, a result
"Congress undoubtedly did not intend." Id. at 360, 370; see also
Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 11-14
(1993); Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188-92.
The same logic applies here. Apart from attorneys’ fees, the
most significant expense parents incur in IDEA cases is the
retention of an expert and the cost of the tests and evaluations the
expert performs. For parents like the Murphys who cannot afford
counsel, expert costs are the most significant expense. The
availability of experts to enable parents to contest adverse
decisions is essential to the fair resolution of due process
hearings. If parents like Pearl and Ted Murphy cannot recover
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the costs of experts, IDEA’s guarantees of both a free and
appropriate public education would be substantially eroded, if
not altogether eliminated.
2. IDEA also seeks to enable parents to challenge school
decisions that adversely affect their child. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.
1400(d)(1), 1412, 1414, 1415; Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
Parents in IDEA proceedings are fighting for their child’s future.
Unlike litigants in other civil rights actions, parents who win
IDEA cases generally collect no monetary compensation and
there is no recovery that can be used to offset the expenses of an
expert. The availability of fees for experts is an indispensable
element of IDEA’s remedial scheme.
Expert assistance is pivotal to parents in IDEA cases. Due
process hearings turn on questions involving the nature and
extent of the child’s disability and the suitability of the measures
the school district proposes to provide the child an appropriate
education. See SRO Decision at 11-13; see also Deal v.
Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 850-51 (6th Cir.
2004); T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572,
577-78 (3d Cir. 2000); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204,
1216 (3d Cir. 1993). Consider the view of District Judge Pratt,
sitting by designation, in his dissent in Neosho R-V School
District v. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2003). Judge Pratt
noted that schools "employ many education and child experts"
and "[a]s one might expect," in due process hearings they "look
to their in house experts to testify on behalf of the school
district’s position." Id. at 1036. Parents "who lack the resources
to hire an expert witness to evaluate and testify on behalf of their
child" are at a serious disadvantage, and the "school district’s
expert, therefore, goes unchallenged," dooming the child’s case.
Id. To "deny a prevailing parent the right to recover the fees paid
to an expert witness forecloses the likelihood that many
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underprivileged children will receive the free appropriate public
education to which they are entitled." Id. at 1036-37.15
Because of the resource imbalance, the playing field in IDEA
due process hearings tilts decidedly in favor of schools.
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 368. Schaffer holds that, unless a state
provides otherwise, parents bear the burden of proof in IDEA
hearings challenging the appropriateness of IEPs. 126 S. Ct. at
528. Schaffer’s premise is that IDEA bearings are structured to
"ensure that the school bears no unique informational advantage."
Id. at 537. But the problem parents face is not so much an
informational deficit as an expert deficit. School districts have on
staff teachers, guidance counselors, psychologists, and other
specialists -- all of whom qualify as, and may testify as, experts.
Parents, in contrast, have to retain experts to challenge school
district decisions. See id. at 536.
Relying on Schaffer, petitioner and the United States suggest
that the imbalance in access to experts is addressed by IDEA’s
requirement that schools provide parents an opportunity for an
independent, expert evaluation of their child at public expense.
Pet. Br. at 31; see also U.S. Br. at 11 n.3. To be sure, Schaffer
underscores the centrality of expert assistance, noting that it
would be unfair to force parents to do battle with school districts
"without an expert with the firepower to match the opposition."
126 S. Ct. at 536. But petitioner and the United States go too far
in suggesting that IDEA requires school districts to supply
x5 Many district judges share this perspective. See, e.g., Brillon v.
Klein Ind. Sch. Dist., 274 F. Supp. 2d 864, 872 (S.D. Tex. 2003), rev’d on
other grounds, 100 Fed. Appx. 309 (5th Cir. 2004); Gross v. Perrysburg
Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 306 F. Supp. 2d 726, 739 (N.D. Ohio 2004);
Pazik v. Gateway Reg’l Sch. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d 217, 221 (D. Mass.
2001); P.G.v. Brick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d 251,267 (D.N.J.
2000).
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experts to parents at public expense.
First, independent evaluations and the retention of an expert
are different things. Evaluators do not act as experts for parents;
they are "independent." Parents do not have free rein in selecting
evaluators; the school district generally furnishes the parents with
a short list from which they may choose. 34 C.F.R. 300.502(a)(2)
(2005). It is not the independent evaluator’s job to help parents
understand the school’s technical evidence, frame questions to
challenge the school’s experts, or perform the other tasks one
expects of a party-retained expert. Nor is there any expectation
that the evaluator will testify on the parents’ behalf at the due
process hearing, let alone a requirement that such testimony
would come at public expense.
Moreover, neither IDEA nor the regulations guarantee
parents an independent evaluation at public expense. IDEA
accords parents only the "opportunity," not the right, to "obtain
an independent educational evaluation of the child." 20 U.S.C.
1415(b)(1) (emphasis added). Although the regulations 
parents a conditional right to a publicly-funded evaluation if they
disagree with the school’s evaluation, the regulations also give
schools the option to deny parents’ request when the school
believes that existing evaluations are adequate. 34 C.F.R.
300.502(b)(2)(ii) (2005). Denials force parents into full-scale 
process hearings on whether, under the circumstances, an
independent evaluation is in fact necessary. Id. The volume of
litigation over school refusals to pay for independent evaluations
suggests that denials are common.16
16 See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493,1500 (9th
Cir. 1996) (school board’s refusal to pay for an independent evaluation
improper); Murphysboro Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 41 F.3d
(continued...)
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Thus, the possibility that parents will obtain a publicly-
funded independent evaluation in no way rectifies the expert
imbalance Congress has recognized. Rather, the imbalance is
addressed in Section 1415(i)(3)(B), which gives parents 
assurance that the expert costs they incur in IDEA proceedings
will be reimbursed if they prevail.
C. Neither Petitioner Nor the United States Offers a
Coherent Reading of Section 1415(i)(3)(B).
The interpretations of Section 1415(i)(3)(B) put forth 
petitioner and the United States are irreconcilable with the
provision’s text. They contend that Section 1415(i)(3)(B)
authorizes the "reimbursement of only attorneys’ fees," and that,
to the extent that "costs" are available to prevailing parents, those
costs are independently authorized under Sections 1821 and
1920, not IDEA. Pet. Br. at 18 (emphasis added); see also U.S.
Br. at 10--12. That construction is not faithful to the language of
Section 1415(i)(3)(B).
1. To start, by contending that Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’s
reference to "costs" is limited by the phrase "attorneys’ fees,"
petitioner and the United States reverse the provision’s actual
language, which authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees "as part
of the costs to the parents." The phrase "p .art of the costs" is not
a phrase of restriction that limits the provision to expenses
lawyers charge in litigating cases. It is instead a phrase of
(...continued)
1162, 1169 (7th Cir. 1994) (same); Hudson v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 1059,
1065 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); Raymond S. v. Ramirez, 918 F. Supp. 1280,
1290-91 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (same); Seals v. Lofiis, 614 F. Supp. 302,
305-06 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (same); cf Ms. M. ex rel. K.M. v. Portland
Sch. Comm., 360 F. 3d 267, 271 (lst Cir. 2004) (school district did 
appeal ruling that it should have paid for an independent evaluation).
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inclusion that covers "the costs to the parents," of which
attorneys’ fees are but one part.
Even worse, their construction takes an eraser to Section
1415(i)(3)(B). They contend that this Court should rewrite
Section 1415 (i)(3)(B) to say that "the court, in its discretion, 
award reasonable attorneys’ fees to the parents of a child with a
disability who is the prevailing party." That rewriting deletes
entirely the phrase "as part of the costs" from Section
1415(i)(3)(B). It not only renders the phrase surplusage, see
Alaska Dep ’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461,489
n.13 (2004); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001), but
deleting five words from a provision that has only thirty-eight
words is hardly a trivial modification. As this Court has
admonished, "parties should not seek to amend [a] statute by
appeal to the Judicial Branch." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.,
534 U.S. 438,462 (2002).
Finally, petitioner and the United States rest their argument
almost exclusively on the fact that there are similarities between
the language in Section 1415(i)(3)(B) and Section 1988. 
there are significant differences as well, which they overlook.
Casey rejected the argument that expert fees are part of
"attorneys’ fees" to parties in Section 1988 district court
litigation. That is not the Murphys’ argument. The claim here is
that the costs of experts are recoverable, not as part of an
attorney’s fees (indeed, the Murphys proceeded pro se), but
because expert costs are "part of the costs to parents" in IDEA
administrative proceedings. As we explain in Part III, these
textual differences underscore that rough similarities in language
do not justify reading statutes with different text and different
aims as if they were the same.
2. To bolster its interpretation, petitioner argues that the
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explicit inclusion of attorneys’ fees reflects Congress’ deliberate
exclusion of expert costs. Pet. Br. at 18. This contention is also
refuted by the text of Section 1415(i)(3)(B). The phrase "aspart
of the costs to the parents" makes plain that attorneys’ fees are
not the exclusive "costs" authorized under the Act; to the
contrary, it drives home that additional costs are authorized as
well: Petitioner’s argument is indistinguishable from the
contention this Court rejected in Barnhart v. Peabody Coal: "We
do not read the enumeration of one case to exclude another unless
it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed
possibility and meant to say no to it." 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)
(citing United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S.
822, 836 (2001)).
3. Both petitioner and the United States claim that Section
1415(i)(3)(F) supports their reading of Section 1415(i)(3)(B).
Section 1415(i)(3)(F) permits a court to reduce attorneys’ 
awards when parents or lawyers unreasonably protract the
controversy, or when lawyers charge unjustifiably high fees.
They contend that, had Congress intended to authorize recovery
of expert costs, "Congress would [not] have gone to such great
lengths in Section 1415(i)(3)(F) to identify the circumstances 
which an award of attorneys’ fees should be reduced but have
remained silent as to expert fees." Pet. Br. at 18 n.6; see also U.S.
Br. at 11.
Congress had good reason to treat lawyers and experts
differently in this regard. Section 1415(i)(3)(F) signals 
courts should scrutinize attorneys’ fee applications closely to
guard against abusive legal tactics and inflated attorneys’ fees.
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687, at 6 (1986). Lawyers and parents
have considerable power to engage in delay-inducing tactics.
Experts do not. Experts do not decide what services they will
provide or whether they will testify; lawyers or parents make
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those determinations. Moreover, Section 1415(i)(3)(B) confers
ample power on the courts to control expert costs, as this case
demonstrates. The district court reduced a request for expert
costs exceeding $29,000, which it thought was a fair valuation of
the services provided, to less than $9,000 to conform with Section
1415 (i)(3)(B)’s mandate. Thus, Section 1415(i)(3)(F)’s 
on abusive litigation tactics by parents and their lawyers is in no
¯ way inconsistent with Congress’ decision in Section
1415(i)(3)(B) to authorize awards of expert 
4. The evidence contradicts the unsupported claims made by
petitioner and the United States that Section 1415(i)(3)(B) 
be construed narrowly to avoid imposing a fiscal burden on
school districts. Pet. Br. at 30-34; U.S. Br. at 23. Awards of
expert costs are generally modest. Many reported cases do not
specify the amount of expert costs, but in those that do, the costs
range from a few hundred dollars to a few thousand dollars.17
iv See, e.g., S. v. Timberlane Reg’l Sch. Dist., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis
4032, at *25 (D.N.H. 2004) ($825); Noyes v. Grossmont Union High Sch.
Dist., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1251 (S.D. Cal. 2004) ($328.33); McC. v.
Corrigan-Camden Ind. Sch. Dist., 909 F. Supp~ 1023, 1033 (E.D. Tex.
1995) ($500); Turton v. Crisp County Sch. Dist., 688 F. Supp. 1535, 1540
(M.D. Ga. 1988) ($415.62); see also R.E. v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 2003
U.S. Dist. Lexis 58, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ($ 2,119.5]); J. v. Bd. of
Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226, 242-243 (D. Conn. 2000) ($2,622); P.G.v.
Brick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d 251, 267 (D.N.J. 2000)
($1,207.50); B. v. Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F. Supp: 2d 777, 784 (D.
Conn. 1999) ($3,450); Poynor v. Cmty. Seh. Dist., 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis
1883, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ($7,600); Field v. Haddonfield Bd. of Educ.,
769 F. Supp. 1313, 1323-24, 1329 (D.N.J. 1991) ($1,801); Hirsch v.
McKenzie, 1988 WL 78859, at *3 (D.D.C. 1988) ($200). There appear 
be only three reported cases in which expert awards exceed $10,000. See
Bd. ofEduc, v. Summers, 358 F. Supp. 2d 462, 472-473 (D. Md. 2005)
($13,974); B.D.v. DeBuono, 177 F. Supp. 2d 201, 208-09 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) ($104,784 in settlement of complex, multi-party proceeding); K.Y.
(continued...)
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Awards in excess of $10,000 are rare. Shifting expert costs is
crucial to parents like the Murphys, for whom a few thousand
dollars is a fortune, and could well be decisive to parents in
determining whether to run the financial risk of hiring an expert.
But there is no evidence that permitting parents to recover expert
costs imposes a fiscal burden on school districts.
II. The History Of Section 1415(i)(3)(B) Demonstrates
That It Authorizes The Payment Of Expert Costs.
When Congress enacted the HCPA, it understood that Section
1415(i)(3)(B) authorized parents to recover not just 
attorney’s fees, but the full costs incurred in the due process
hearing, including expert costs. That understanding is reflected
in the text of Section 1415(i)(3)(B), as well as the 
provision requiring the GAO study and report. It is also reflected
in both the implementation history of Section 1415(i)(3)(B) 
the drafting history of the HCPA, each of which demonstrates
that, at the time Section 1415(i)(3)(B) was enacted, there 
doubt that it authorized the recovery of expert costs.
A. The Dnplementation History of Section 1415(i)(3)(B)
Confirms the Availability of Expert Costs.
Conspicuously omitted from the briefs of petitioner and the
(...continued)
v. Me. Twp. High Sch. Dist. No. 207, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2123, at "13
(N.D. Ill. 1999) ($11,190). The modest amounts awarded in expert costs
drive home that petitioner’s cost-based objections are especially hollow.
Had the Murphys had counsel in this matter, which spanned five years,
involved multiple administrative proceedings, and resulted in two
published Second Circuit opinions, seven district court opinions, and one
ruling by a state court, the attorneys’ fees would have dwarfed the modest
costs awarded by the district court.
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United States is any account of Section 1415(i)(3)(B)’s initial
implementation. The most reliable sources for interpreting a
statute are contemporaneous ones--when recollections are fresh
and source materials easy to find-- not those nearly twenty years
removed. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S.
865, 873-74 (1999); MCI Telecomrns., 512 U.S. at 228.
Nonetheless, petitioner and the United States ignore all of the pre-
2002 sources because, until 2002, the issue had been resolved
oyerwhelmingly in the parents’ favor.
To start with, the GAO Report submitted to Congress just
three years after the HCPA’s passage made explicit that
consultant costs, expert witness fees, and the costs of tests or
evaluations necessary to the parents’ case are reimbursable under
the Act. GAO Report at 13. This contemporaneous interpretation
of the Act should be accorded deference. Cf Norwegian
Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
The initial judicial constructions of the Act also uniformly
favored coverage of expert costs. During the first five years after
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) was enacted, every court to consider the
question concluded that IDEA authorizes the reimbursement of
expert fees. Foremost among these decisions was the Third
Circuit’s 1988 ruling in Arons, 842 F.2d at 63. At least six
district courts in four different circuits reached the same
conclusion.~8
This Court’s 1991 decision in Casey had little impact on the
18 See Field, 769 F. Supp. at 1323-24; Kattan v. District of Columbia,
1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14543, at "9-10 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d, 995 F.2d 274
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Doe v. Watertown Sch. Comm., 701 F. Supp. 264, 266
(D. Mass. 1988); Chang v. Bd. of Educ., 685 F. Supp. 96, 100 (D.N.J.
1988); Turton, 688 F. Supp. at 1540; Hirsch, 1988 WL 78859, at *3.
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way lower courts viewed Section 1415(i)(3)(B). During 
decade following Casey (1991-2001), no court of appeals and
only a handful of district courts (acting in response to Casey) held
that expert costs were not recoverable under the statute.19 On the
other hand, during the same time-frame, twenty-nine district
judges found expert costs compensable under IDEA.2° Thus,
~9 Prior to 2002, only four cases squarely held that Section
1415(i)(3)(B) does not authorize reimbursement of expert Brandon
K. v. New Lenox Sch. Dist., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20006, at "9-12 (N.D.
Ill. 2001); Eirschele v. Craven County Bd. ofEduc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 655,
659 (E.D.N.C. 1998); Cynthia K. v. Bd. of Educ., 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis
4054, at *6 (N.D. II1. 1996); Jennings v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 1992
U.S. Dist. Lexis 20575, at "41-42 (M.D. Fla. 1992). One court said so 
dicta, Mayo v. Booker, 56 F. Supp. 2d 597, 599 (D. Md. 1999), but other
courts in the same district have rejected Mayo. See Summers, 358 F.
Supp. 2d at 472-73 (and case cited therein). In Shanahan v. Bd. ofEduc.,
953 F. Supp. 440, 446 n.9 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), the court denied expert costs
¯ on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to submit any "authority for
awarding a prevailing party expert fees" under IDEA, even though, at the
time, there was contrary case law. See, e.g., Straube v. Fla. Union Free
Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 1164, 1182 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
20 First Circuit: Pazik v. Gateway Reg’l Sch. Dist., 130 F. Supp. 2d
217, 221-22 (D. Mass. 2001); Gonzalez v. P.R. Dept. ofEduc., 1 F. Supp.
2d 111, 116-17 (D.P.R. 1998); Arunim v. Foxborough Pub. Sch., 970 F.
Supp. 51, 55 (D. Mass. 1997); P.S.v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., No.
95-154-M, 24 IDELR ¶ 1141 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 1996); Fenneman v. Town
of Gorham, 802 F. Supp. 542, 544, 548-49 (D. Me. 1992). Second
Circuit: B.D.v. DeBuono, 177 F. Supp. 2d 201,208-09 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
J. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226, 242-43 (D. Conn. 2000); P.L.v.
Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 64 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D. Corm. 1999); B. 
Weston Bd. of Educ., 34 F. Supp. 2d 777, 784 (D. Conn. 1999); Connors
v. Mills, 34 F. Supp. 2d 795, 808 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); C.G.v. New Haven
Bd. of Educ., 988 F. Supp. 60, 68 (D. Conn. 1997); Straube, 801 F. Supp.
at 1182. Third Circuit: P.G.v. Brick Twp. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d
251,267 (D.N.J. 2000); Woodside v. Phila. Bd. of Educ., 2000 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 568, at "16-17 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Borough of Palmyra Bd. of Educ.
(continued...)
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from 1986 until 2001 -- ten years after Casey and fifteen years
after Section 1415(i)(3)(B) was added to IDEA- the 
Circuit and thirty-five district judges concluded that the Act
authorized awards of expert costs, while only a handful of district
judges saw the matter otherwise.
Even the United States recognized that expert costs are
covered by Section 1415(i)(3)(B). In a Federal Register 
published after the 1997 IDEA amendments, the Department of
Education modified its attorneys’ fees regulation, 34 C.F.R.
300.513, "to make it clear that the prohibition against using Part
B funds for attorney’s fees also applies to the related costs of a
party in an action or proceeding, such as depositions, expert
witnesses, settlements, and other related costs." 64 Fed.
Reg.12,406, 12,615 (Mar. 12, 1999) (emphasis added); see also
65 Fed. Reg. 53,808, 53,812 (Sept. 5, 2000).
(...continued)
v. R.C.,No. 97-6199, 31 IDELR ¶ 3 (D.N.J. July 29, 1999); B.K.v. Toms
River Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462, 474 (D,N.J. 1998); S.D.v. Manville
Bd. of Educ., 989 F. Supp. 649, 657 (D.N.J. 1998); E.M.v. Millville Bd.
of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312, 317-318 (D.N.J. 1994). Fifth Circuit: McC.
v. Corrigan-Camden I d. Sch. Dist., 909 F. Supp. 1023, 1033 (E.D. Tex.
1995). Seventh Circuit: Koswenda v. Flossmoor Sch. Dist. No. 161,227
F. Supp. 2d 979, 996-98 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Poynor v. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist.
No. 300, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18831, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 1999); K.Y.v. Me.
Twp., 1999 U.S. Dist Lexis 2123, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Dale M. v. Bd.
of Educ., 29 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (C.D. Ill. 1998), rev’d on other
grounds, 237 F.3d 813 (7th Cir. 2001); Hunger v. Leininger, 1993 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 3080, at *24 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Eighth Circuit: Ind. Sch. Dist.
No. 283 v. S.D., 948 F. Supp. 892, 897 n.4 (D. Minn. 1996). Ninth
Circuit: Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7J, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis
5235, at *2-3 (D. Or. 1992), aff’d, 980 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1992). D.C.
Circuit: Calloway v. District of Columbia, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13751
(D.D.C. 1999); Bailey v. District of Columbia, 839 F. Supp. 888, 892
(D.D.C. 1993); Aranow v. District of Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 318, 318
(D.D.C. 1992).
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Petitioner and the United States presumably begin their
account in 2002 to coincide with the Eighth Circuit’s two-to-one
decision in Neosho R- V School District v. Clark, 315 F. 3d 1022,
that Case)/precludes expert costs under IDEA. Following
Neosho, the Seventh Circuit in T.D. v. LaGrange School District,
349 F.3d 469 (2003), a divided D.C. Circuit in Goldring v.
District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70 (2005), and one district court,
Hiram C. v. Manteca Unified School District, 2004 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 29177, at "9-10 (E.D. Cal. 2004), joined the no-expert-
costs camp. However, a majority of courts, including the Second
Circuit in Murphy and nine district courts in the First, Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, have rejected the
reasoning in Neosho and held that expert costs are available.21
The point here is not that the majority rules. Rather, it is that
these decisions belie petitioner and the United States’ central
claim that Section 1415 (i)(3)(B) "unambiguously" excludes 
award of expert costs. In Casey, the Court closely examined
opinions in Civil Rights Act cases "at the time the provision was
enacted" and found that they cut against the conclusion that
Congress intended that expert costs be recoverable under Section
1988. See Casey, 494 U.S. at 94-97 (reviewing cases). Here, the
21 Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332,
336 (2d Cir. 2005); Czarniewy v. District of Columbia, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5161, at "15-16 (D.D.C. 2005); Summers, 358 F. Supp. 2d at
472-473; Gross v. Perrysburg Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 306 F. Supp. 2d
726, 738-739 (N.D. Ohio 2004); Noyes v. Grossmont Union High Sch.
Dist., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1251 (S.D. Cal. 2004); S. v. Timberlane
Reg’l Sch. Dist., 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4032, at *22-25 (D.N.H. 2004);
R.E.v.N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 58, at *8-9
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); E.R.v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis
26722 (D.N.J. 2003); Brillon v. Klein Ind. Sch. Dist., 274 F. Supp. 2d
864, 870-872 (S.D. Tex. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 100 Fed. Appx.
309 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Lamoine Sch. Comm. v. Ms. Z, 353 F. Supp.
2d 18, 44(D. Me. 2005) (awarding fees to educational consultant).
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evidence of contemporary judicial understanding cuts in the
opposite direction and is unequivocal; it confirms the Murphys’
reading of Section 1415 (i)(3)(B). It is implausible to contend, 
do petitioner and the United States, that all of these decisions, the
GAO, and indeed, the Department of Education, are wrong
because the statute "unambiguously" forbids the conclusion they
reached.
B. The Drafiing History of HCPA Confirms Congress ’Intent
that Prevailing Parents are Entitled to Recover Expert Costs.
The drafting history of the HCPA reinforces the
straightforward, textual reading of Section 1415(i)(3)(B) set 
above. See Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 126 S. Ct. 1264
(2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611,
2625-27 (2005). It demonstrates that at every stage of Congress’
deliberations there was a bipartisan consensus in both Houses to
authorize prevailing parents to recover their expert costs.
1. Congress enacted the HCPA to respond to Smith v.
Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), which held that, in light of the
comprehensiveness of IDEA’s remedial scheme, it provided an
exclusive remedy and, for that reason, parents could not recover
attorneys’ fees by joining claims under the Civil Rights or
Rehabilitation Acts. Justice Brennan’s dissent, joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, urged Congress to revisit the issue. Id. at
i030-31.2z
22 Only recovery of "attorneys’ fees" under the Civil Rights Act and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act were at issue in Smith. It did not
address whether IDEA’s provision for equitable relief, 20 U.S.C.
1415(i)(3)(C)(iii), authorized the reimbursement of expenses parents 
in IDEA proceedings. But this provision is relevant as well, because it
reflects Congress’ understanding that IDEA empowered courts to make(continued...)
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Congress did just that. Nineteen days later, identical bills
were introduced in both the House and Senate to overturn Smith.
The bills provided, among other things, that "[i]n any action or
proceeding brought under this subsection, the court, in its
discretion, may award a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs to a parent or legal representative of a handicapped child or
youth who is the prevailing party." See, e.g., S. 2895, 98th Cong.
2 (1984). No hearing was held in either House during 1984.
On February 6, 1985, Senator Lowell Weicker introduced a
bill, identical to that introduced in 1984, before the 99th
Congress. See Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1985,
S. 415, 99th Cong. (1985). On March 7, Representative Pat
Williams introduced a modified version of the original bill in the
House designed to address concerns that were raised the previous
year. See Hearing on H.R. 1523 Before the Subcomm. on Select
Education of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong.
2-3 (1985) (House Hearings). Hearings were then held, and
many witnesses emphasized that the fair resolution of IDEA
(...continued)
prevailing parents whole. As noted above, in Burlington, this Court
unanimously interpreted IDEA’s equitable provision broadly, to require
school boards to reimburse parents for their expenditures on unilateral
placements ultimately found warranted. IDEA’s equitable provision was
enacted in the fall of 1975, just a few months after this Court’s decision in
Alyeska Pipeline Services Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975),
had disapproved the use of non-statutory equitable factors to reimburse
attorneys’ fees, but before Congress had reacted to Alyeska by enacting
the Civil Rights Act of 1976. Nothing in Alyeska -- or Smith -- spoke to
the question of reimbursing expenses for expert assistance, a practice that
had been approved by this Court as an element of equitable relief as
recently as Bradley v. City of Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 723
(1974). It did not become clear until this Court’s decisions in Crawford
and Casey that expert costs were similarly affected.
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cases depends on parents having expert assistance.23 No witness
disagreed. Nor did anyone suggest that prevailing parents should
not be reimbursed for expert costs.24
Following the hearings, a substitute version of the Senate bill
was proposed that provided that a court may award"a reasonable
attorney’s fee, reasonable witness fees, and other reasonable
expenses of the civil action, in addition to the costs" to a parent
who is the prevailing party. See S. Rep. No. 99-112, at 7 (1985)
(Senate Report); see also id. at 4-11. But the substitute also
included a provision capping the fees that could be awarded legal
services lawyers, which was opposed by House and Senate
23 See, e.g., House Hearings, at 42 (testimony of Beverly J. Galarza);
id. at 44 (testimony of Henry W. Christopher); see also Hearing on S. 415
Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the S. Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 99th Cong. 10-11 (1985) (Senate Hearings)
(testimony of Edward Abrahamson); id. at 35 (testimony of Edwin W.
Martin); id. at 92-93 (statement of the Florida Governor’s Commission
on Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities); id. at 113-14 (additional
comment of E. Richard Larson).
24 The National School Board Association (NSBA) testified and
submitted a prepared statement during the House hearings and submitted
extensive comments for the record of the Senate Hearing. NSBA made
known its concerns about the fiscal impact the amendments might have
and about the availability of attorneys’ fees for due process hearings,
which, in NSBA’s view, might make them more adversarial. At no point,
however, did the NSBA express concern about permitting prevailing
parents to recover expert fees. See House Hearings, at 23-28; Senate
Hearings, at 61-79. This was not an oversight. NSBA’s Senate
submission expressed concern about authorizing recovery of "the costs of
experts during the I.E.P. conference," which is non-adversarial, id. at 70,
but raised no objection to shifting the costs of experts used during
adversarial due process hearings.
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Democrats, as well as other controversial provisions./d.25 These
provisions-- not expert costs -- prompted a bipartisan group of
senators, led by Senators Hatch, Weicker, and Dole, but also
including Senators Kerry, Kennedy, and Metzenbaum, to propose
a streamlined substitute bill, referred to as the Hatch-Weicker
substitute. Id. at 15-16. Hatch-Weicker provided for
discretionary awards of"a reasonable attorney’s fee in addition
to the costs to a parent" of a child with a disability. 131 Cong.
Rec. 21389.
Hatch-Weicker (Amendment No. 561) was accepted 
motion by Senator Dole at the outset of the Senate debate. Id.
Senator Weicker explained that Hatch-Weicker had been
"developed in conjunction with and agreed to by the Department
of Education and the Department of Justice." Id. He
characterized the cost and fee provision as consistent with "more
[than] 130 fee shifting statutes" already enacted, id. at 21390, and
then described it as follows:
S. 415 will enable courts to compensate
parents for whatever reasonable costs they
had to incur to fully secure what was
guaranteed to them by the EHA. As in other
fee shifting statutes, it is our intent that such
awards will include, at the discretion of the
court, reasonable attorney’s fees, necessary
expert witness fees, and other reasonable
expenses which were necessary for parents
to vindicate their claim to a free appropriate
public education for their handicapped child.
2s See, e.g., Senate Report, at 17-18 (additional views of Senators Kerry,
Kennedy, Pell, Dodd, Simon, Metzenbaum and Matsunaga); 132 Cong. Rec.
17608 (1986) (Rep. Williams).
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Id. No Senator questioned this statement, although disputes over
other matters were aired. The Senate adopted S. 415 without a
recorded vote. Id. at 21393.
Proceedings in the House reflect the same commitment to
making expert costs available to prevailing parents. Following
the House hearings, a substitute version of H.R. 1523 was
reported out of committee that authorized courts to "award
reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs" to prevailing
parents. H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, at 1, 5 (1985) (House Report).
The House Report explained that "the phrase ’expenses and
costs’ includes expenses of expert witnesses; the reasonable costs
of any study, report, test, or project which is found to be
necessary for the preparation of the parents’ or guardian’s due
process hearing, state administrative review or civil action; as
well as traditional costs and expenses incurred in the course of
litigating a case (e.g., depositions and interrogatories)." Id. at 6.
There was no objection to this provision, although, like the
Senate bill, the House Bill did contain controversial provisions,
including one authorizing the recovery of attorneys’ fees and
costs for administrative proceedings, even in the absence of
litigation. See id. at 15-17 (supplemental views).
By the time the bill reached the floor, there was bipartisan
agreement on a new sub stitute bill. 131 Cong. Rec. 31369 ( 1985)
(remarks of Rep. Williams). The new bill did not change the
cost-shifting provision. Butto accommodate concerns about the
bill’s cost, it did add a provision directing the GAO to study and
report to Congress on the legislation’s fiscal impact, accompanied
by a "sunset" provision. Id. at 31370. With the compromise in
place, the House passed H.R. 1523 without a recorded vote. Id.
at 31377. Atno point during the House’s deliberations on H.R.
1523 was any objection raised to allowing prevailing parents to
recoup expert costs.
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After the House vote, conferees met to iron out differences
between the two bills. The conferees largely accepted S. 415
insofar as it defined parents’ rights to recover attorneys’ fees and
costs, and they accepted H.R. 1523 insofar as it directed the GAO
to study the fiscal impact of the legislation and report back to
Congress, but without a sunset provision. See H.R. Conf. Rep.
No. 99-687, at 1-3 (1986) (Conference Report). The Joint
Statement identified the various issues the Conferees had
resolved. Reiterating what the House and Senate had already
been told about the provision, the Conferees explained that "the
term ’attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ include[s] reasonable
expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs of
any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the
preparation of the parent or guardian’s case in the action or
proceeding, as well as traditional costs incurred in the course of
litigating a case." Id. at 5.26 The Conference Report and the
accompanying Joint Statement were printed together (amounting
to seven pages of text) and circulated to all members of Congress
in advance of the vote on the final bill; they were also reprinted
in the Congressional Record. 132 Cong. Rec. 16701 (1986).27
z6 The Conferees did make one notable change to the wording of what
became Section 1415(i)(3)(B). It substituted the phrase "attorneys’ as
part of the costs" for "attorney’s fees in addition to the costs." The Joint
Statement explains that "[t]his change incorporates the Supreme Court
Marek v. Chesny [, 473 U.S. 1 (1985)] decision." Conference Report, at 5.
Marek held that where the underlying statute defines "costs" to include
attorneys’ fees, attorneys’ fees are included in offers of settlement under
Rule 68. Although the Conferees’ modification of the language had
implications for Rule 68 settlement offers, it had no bearing on the meaning
of"costs." Id.; see also Marek, 473 U.S. at 11-12.
27 Congress does this for a reason. The Joint Statement sets forth the
understanding of the Members of Congress who drafted the final bill,
which reflects compromises on issues dividing the two houses. The Joint
(continued...)
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Both the Senate and House accepted the Conference Report.
132 Cong. Rec. 16823-25 (1986); id. at 17607-12. At no point
was any objection raised to the Conferees’ statement hat expert
costs would be subject to reimbursement under the Act. The Act
was signed into law by President Reagan on August 5, 1986.
2. Despite this clear intent, petitioner claims that "no one
suggested that the language Congress enacted--’ attorneys’ fees
as part of the costs’ -- encompassed xpert fees." Pet. Br. at 24
n. 10. That assertion is incorrect: the Joint Statement, signed by
the House and Senate Conferees, said just that.
Equally unavailing is petitioner’s claim that the legislative
history proves "that Congress purposefully declined to include
expert costs in attorneys’ fees." Id. Petitioner points out that the
Senate bill initially authorized the award of "witness fees," but
the final bill omitted that term. That is true, but does not tell the
whole story. As shown above, the "witness fee" language was
(...continued)
Statement informs Members of Congress of the final bill’s contents and
how it differs from the bills approved in the House and Senate. After the
Conferees issue the Report, it then goes back to both chambers, where it
is distributed to Members before they vote on whether to accept the
Conference Report. Only if both chambers approve the Conference
Report is the legislation submitted to the President. The Joint Statement
is thus a document of considerable authority. See Hon. Robert A.
Katzmann, Courts and Congress 63~54 (1997) (quoting Judge James 
Buckley as remarking that, as a Senator, "my understanding of most of
the legislation I voted on was based entirely on my reading of its
language and, where necessary, on explanations contained in the
accompanying report"); see also City of Columbus v. Ours Garage &
Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440 (2002) (citing Conference Report
to construe statute); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 317 (2001) (same);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 74 (1981) ("The [Conference] Report,
therefore, is considerably more significant than a typical report of a single
House, and its findings are in effect findings of the entire Congress.").
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part of a controversial bill that was scrapped, in part, because it
capped fees for legal services lawyers. It was replaced by the
Hatch-Weicker substitute. As Senator Weicker explained when
he introduced Hatch-Weicker, the substitute’s language was to be
construed to cover "attorney’s fees, necessary expert witness
fees, and other reasonable expenses" necessary for the parents’
case. 131 Cong. Rec. at 21389-90(1985).28
Nor does the omission of the word "expenses" from the final
legislation demonstrate an intent to exclude expert costs, as
petitioner contends. The House receded to the Senate’s bill in
Conference, but did so based on the Joint Statement’s explanation
that expenses and expert costs are covered by Section
1415(i)(3)(B). See Conference Report, at 5. And fundamentally,
recovery of"expenses" is part of the Act; the GAO was tasked to
report on "expenses" recovered by prevailing parents to
Congress. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, these minor textual
changes do not demonstrate that Congress "purposefully declined
to include expert costs" in the Act.
Finally, petitioner and the United States contend that the
focus of the legislative effort was to restore to parents the right to
recover attorneys’ fees, not expert costs. Pet. Br. at 24 n. 10; U.S.
Br. at 19 n.7. That assertion is partially true. It is correct that
"attorneys’ fees’; were the sole item at issue in Smith. But to
suggest that Congress in the HCPA single-mindedly focused on
attorneys’ fees is to dramatically understate what Congress
sought to achieve in the HCPA, which reflects Congress’ full-
28 Senator Weicker’s reference to 130 similar statutes shows that he
was unaware of the variations among these statutes that this Court later
relied on in Casey. That is not surprising. As noted above, nothing in the
record of Congress’ deliberations on the HCPA suggests that Senator
Weicker or his colleagues had any expectation that the variations in drafting
cost-shifting provisions had the significance later given to them in Casey.
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bore disapproval of Smith.29
Petitioner and the United States fixate on what the HCPA
purportedly did not do. But what is striking about their
discussion of the history of the HCPA is how little they say about
what Congress did do in the Act. In the course of shaping the
HCPA, Congress resolved many contentious issues. But there
was not one objection to authorizing prevailing parents to recover
expert costs. Nor was there any reason, given the then-prevailing
understanding about the meaning of the word "costs," to
conclude that Congress had anything else in mind. All of the
indicia of congressional intent -- the full text of the HCPA, its
purpose and the purpose of IDEA, and the resolve of the leaders
of both parties to support the Hatch-Weicker substitute --
support the conclusion that Congress authorized the recovery of
expert costs.
III. Crawford Fitting And Casey Do Not Call For A
Different Reading Of The Act.
Every case holding that IDEA does not permit awards of
expert costs has relied on Casey to conclude that "costs" has a
legal, term-of-art meaning that excludes expert fees. This
reliance is misplaced. Neither CrawfordFitting nor Casey sheds
light on what Congress meant in 1986 when it enacted the HCPA.
29 Congress accomplished many goals in the HCPA: Section 2, codified
at 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B), provided the authorization for the award 
"attorneys’ fees" found lacking in Smith; Section 3, codified at 1415(/),
overturned Smith’s basic holding by providing that claims under the Civil
Rights and Rehabilitation Acts may be maintained with IDEA claims;
Section 4 directed the GAO Report; and Section 5 made Section
1415(i)(3)(B) retroactive to all cases brought or pending after July 4, 
(the day before Smith was decided).
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To understand why these decisions do not inform the
interpretation of IDEA, it is useful to review their specific
holdings. In Crawford Fitting, the Court held that the expenses
of hiring an expert could not be assessed against a losing party as
part of "costs" in federal court proceedings governed by 28
U.S.C. 1821 and t 920. "[A]bsent explicit statutory or contractual
authorization for the taxation of the expenses of a litigant’s
witnesses as costs, federal courts are bound by the limitations set
out in 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and § 1920," which do not authorize the
shifting of expert costs. 482 U.S. at 445. Building on Crawford
Fitting, Casey held that Section 1988’s authorization for awards
of "attorneys’ fees" did not extend to expert fees. 499 U.S. at
96-97. The Court supported its conclusion by first pointing to 28
U.S.C. 1821(b) and 1920(c) -- which fix compensation 
witnesses (not just experts) in federal court proceedings -- and
held that there was no indication that Congress repealed these
provisions by implication when it enacted Section 1988. Id. at
87-88. Casey also observed that Congress, in thirty-four other
cost-shifting statutes, explicitly provided authorization to
reimburse expert witnesses. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it was fair to conclude that Congress had not intended
Section 1988’s authorization to award attorneys’ fees as
encompassing expert fees. Id. at 88-94.3°
30 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly authorized awards of
expert fees in Section 1988. P.L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991),
codified at 42 U.S.C. 1988(c). Congress did not revisit IDEA in that
enactment. At that time, there was no need to: No court had ruled, or
even suggested, that IDEA did not provide authorization for expert costs.
Nor did Congress revisit the issue when IDEA was reauthorized in 1997
or 2004. Both petitioner and the United States point to proposed
legislation in 2004 that would have amended IDEA and many other
statutes to provide explicit authorization for expert fees awards. Pet. Br.
at 22 n.8; U.S. Br. at 22-23 n.8. But as this Court emphasized earlier
this Term, "[f]ailed legislative proposals are a ’particularly dangerous
(continued...)
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In Casey, the Court distinguished IDEA from Section 1988
by pointing to the Joint Statement’s explanation that expert costs
would be reimbursable. The Court remarked: "The specification
[in the Joint Statement] would have been quite unnecessary if the
ordinary meaning of the term included those elements. The
statement is an apparent effort to depart from ordinary meaning
and to define a term of art." 499 U.S. at 91 n.5 (emphasis in
original). Courts have disputed the meaning of this footnote.
Compare, e.g., Murphy, Pet. App. at 10a-1 !a, with Goldring,
416 F.3d at 75. But one thing is clear: Casey avoided pre-judging
the issue in this case. And for good reason. There are many
factors that differentiate this case from Casey, beyond the most
obvious one -- that IDEA is a very different statute than Section
1988, and the language of IDEA has to be examined in the
context of that statute. Leocal, 543 U.S. at 8-10.
1. First and foremost, the text of Section 1415(i)(3)(B),
coupled with Congress’ direction to the GAO to study and report
back on the costs of expenses and consultants in IDEA cases,
leave no doubt that Section 1415(i)(3)(B) authorizes courts 
reimburse expert costs to prevailing parents. Statutory language
must be construed in light of the historical context facing the
Congress that enacted it; not through the lens of hindsight, post-
enactment developments, or the language of other, unrelated
statutes. MCI Telecomms., 512 U.S. at 228. Nothing in the
HCPA’s history suggests that Congress anticipated the legal,
term-of-art meaning that CrawfordFitting and Casey ascribed to
the word "costs," and there is much to refute it. At every turn,
(..:continued)
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute.’" Lockhart v.
United States, 126 S. Ct. 699, 702 (2005) (quoting United States v.
Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 287 (2002) and Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633,650 (1990)).
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Congress expressed its understanding that courts would construe
the cost-shifting language in the Act to authorize awards of expert
costs, not to preclude such awards. In so doing, Congress made
it clear that "costs" should be read in its ordinary sense, not as a
term of art. To the extent that Crawford and Casey demand
clarity on Congress’ part, that test is amply met here.
2. The text and purposes of IDEA and Section 1988 are quite
different, which also suggests that Casey has no bearing here.
There are key textual differences between the two provisions that
reflect their different aims. Section 1415(i)(3)(B) speaks 
costs to the parents." Section 1988 authorizes costs to "the
prevailing party." This difference reflects Congress’ intent in
IDEA to authorize the reimbursement of costs parents incur
mainly in challenging adverse school board determinations in
state administrative proceedings,31 whereas Section 1988 was
aimed at permitting prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to recover
their litigation costs in federal court. Section 1988 does not
ordinarily authorize awards of costs incurred in state
administrative proceedings. See, e.g., N.C. Dep ’t of Transp. v.
Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986); Webb v. Dyer
CountyBd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234 (1985). Because the aims 
Section 1415(i)(3)(B) are so different, petitioner’s 
uncritically to engraft Casey’s understanding about the meaning
of"attomeys’ fees" in Section 1988 onto the authorization for
"the costs to the parents" in Section 1415(i)(3)(B) is unavailing.
Rough similarities in statutory language cannot be invoked as a
means of subverting stark differences in congressional intent.
3~ Every circuit recognizes that parents may bring an action under IDEA
solely to recover fees and costs incurred in state administrative proceedings.
See, e.g., Eggers v. Bullitt County Sch. Dist., 854 F.2d 892, 895-898 (6th
Cir.1988); Brown v. Griggsville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. Four, 12 F.3d
681,683-85 (7thCir. 1993); Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165,
169-172 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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Moreover, Casey rested in part on the proposition that
permitting expert fees to be awarded in litigation under Section
1988 as part of attorneys’ fees would work an implied repeal of
28 U.S.C. 1821(b) and 1920. Casey, 499 U.S. at 87-88. But
those provisions, by their express terms, apply only to
proceedings in federal court. As noted, IDEA proceedings are
different from the civil rights cases covered by Section 1988,
because the record in IDEA cases is compiled during state due
process hearings where Sections 1821(b) and 1920 have 
applicability. Thus, Casey’ s implied repeal theory has no bearing
on IDEA.32
3. Casey also based its ruling on a determination that, at the
time Congress enacted Section 1988, cost-shifting provisions
authorizing the award of"attomey’s fees as part of the costs" had
32 The majority opinions in Goldring and Neosho suggest that courts
in IDEA cases could award costs and witness fees for state due process
hearings under Sections 1821(b) and 1920. See Goldring, 416 F.3d at 77
n.4; Neosho R-V Sch. Dist., 315 F.3d at 1031-32. Both opinions
disregard the text of those provisions, which apply only to proceedings in
federal court. 28 U.S.C. 1821 (a)(2) (defining "court of the United States"
for the purpose of witness fees to include only federal and not state
courts); 28 U.S.C. 1920 (permitting only a Judge or clerk of a federal
court to tax costs); 28 U.S.C. 451 (defining court of the United States);
see also Neosho R-V Sch. Dist., 315 F.3d at 1034 (Pratt, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority opinion on this ground). Goldring and Neosho also
overlook another consequence of their holdings: Congress provided that
IDEA cases could be brought in state as well as federal court, 20 U.S.C.
1415(i)(A)(2), and it is by no means clear that Sections 1821 and 
authorize an award of costs in state courts. Under petitioner’s argument
and the holdings in GoIdring and Neosho, the authorization for "costs" in
IDEA has no independent meaning. That interpretation leaves parents in
state court IDEA cases potentially worse off than their federal
counterparts, who are at least entitled to the costs authorized under
Sections 1821 and 1920, while state court plaintiffs may be left only
whatever costs, if any, are authorized under state law.
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"a clearly accepted meaning in legislative and judicial practice"
that excluded awards of expert costs. 499 U.S. at 88-94. Here,
the "legislative and judicial practice" cuts in the opposite
direction. All of the relevant legislative material confirm that
Congress understood the term costs to include expert costs,
including the House Report, Senator Weicker’s floor statement,
the Joint Statement, the GAO reporting requirement, and the
GAO’s Report. Even the Department of Education held that
view. The same is true of the "judicial practice" following the
HCPA’s passage. Courts uniformly understood the HCPA to
confer authority to award the costs of experts. See supra at II.A.
4. More generally, the Congress that enacted the HCPA had
every reason to think that courts would respect its intentions as
made plain in the legislative history. The HCPA was enacted in
response to Smith v. Robinson, which relied heavily on legislative
history to conclude that Congress intended IDEA to provide a
comprehensive remedial scheme. 468 U.S. at 1010-11. Chief
Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court in Tatro (issued on the
same day as Smith) relied on IDEA’s legislative history in
construing the scope of the Act’s exclusion of"medical services."
Tatro, 468 U.S. at 893; see also RoWley, 458 U.S. at 192-98
(reviewing legislative history to determine what is an
"appropriate" education). Thus, for the Congress that enacted the
HCPA, the notion that a reviewing court would shut its eyes to
the Joint Statement and other uncontroverted expressions of
intent in the legislative history to resolve any possible doubt
about the statute’s meaning would have been alien.
5. Finally, the interpretative task in Casey was different from
the one here because Section 1988 is a stand-alone cost-shifting
provision that applies to many civil rights statutes. Thus, in
construing Section 1988, Casey could not follow the Court’s
general practice of looking to related textual provisions to shed
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light on Section 1988’s meaning, but instead found it necessary
to look at other statutes, enacted by other Congresses. That is not
tree here. As noted above, when Section 1415(i)(3)(B) 
examined in the context of related provisions in both the HCPA
and IDEA, Congress’ intent is clear.
IV. Spending Clause Considerations Do Not Affect
The Interpretation Of Section 1415(i)(3)(B).
Petitioner and the United States argue that Section
1415(i)(3)(B) should be construed to exclude expert costs 
rules of interpretation applicable to Spending Clause legislation.
Pet. Br. at 19-20; U.S. Br. at 13. Section 1415(i)(3)(B) has 
the law for twenty years, but they cite no case involving expert
costs in which a Spending Clause argument was made, let alone
accepted. Nor did petitioner make a Spending Clause argument
in the lower courts.33 There is good reason why this argument
was not raised before -- it is wrong and it is beside the point.
It is wrong because the HCPA was enacted under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 It is wholly inaccurate to say, as
33 Petitioner has therefore forfeited this argument. See, e.g., TR W, Inc.
v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 34 (2001) (declining to reach question "not raised
or briefed below").
34 The HCPA made the Act’s cost-shifting provision retroactive to
cases pending at the time this Court decided Smith. In litigation over the
retroactivity provision’s constitutionality, the courts uniformly rejected
Spending Clause claims because the HCPA provided ample notice to
states and because it was enacted pursuant to Congress’ authority under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, e.g., Fontenot v. La. Bd. of
Elementary & Secondary Educ., 835 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1988), or pursuant
to Congress’ power under Section 5 and the Spending Clause. See, e.g.,
Mitten v. Muscogee County Sch. Dist., 877 F.2d 932 (1 lth Cir. 1989);
(continued...)
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does petitioner, that IDEA is exclusively a Spending Clause
statute. IDEA was enacted under Section 5 as well. See 20
U.S.C. 1400(c)(6) (Congress enacted IDEA "to assure 
protection of the law"). This Court has never held that Spending
Clause principles cabin the interpretation of IDEA, and such a
ruling would be at odds with many of the Court’s prior IDEA
cases. See, e.g., Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369; Smith, 468 U.S. at
1010-11; Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180, 192-200.
More fundamentally, the argument is beside the point. The
Spending Clause requires Congress to give states fair notice of
their fiscal obligations when they accept federal funds. See, e.g.,
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). The
HCPA did just that. In the years following the HCPA’s
enactment, courts overwhelmingly interpreted Section
1415(i)(3)(B) as imposing an obligation on school boards 
parents their costs, including the costs of experts, when they
prevailed. No school district objected to the award of expert
costs on Spending Clause grounds. Nor did petitioner Arlington
Central. The question here is not the adequacy of notice. The
question is whether now, twenty years after passage of the
HCPA, there is reason to question the judgment of the vast
majority of courts, the GAO, and even the United States, all of
whom concluded that Section 1415(i)(3)(B) authorizes courts 
award the costs of experts to prevailing parents. There is none.
(...continued)
Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1988).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the judgment below should be
affirmed.
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